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Vulgate accountability:
insights from the field of football
Christine Cooper and Joanne Johnston
Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, UK
Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to critically reflect upon the use of the term accountability in
the twenty-first century and its role in “remaking the world in favour of the most powerful” using the
theories of Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Lacan.
Design/methodology/approach – The paper examines the notion of accountability by analyzing a
case study of the hostile takeover of Manchester United Football Club by the Glazer family. The field
of football presents an interesting arena in which to study accountability because of its extremely
interested and active fans who search for information on every aspect of their clubs. Lacanian theory is
drawn upon to add to understanding of the psychopathology which the demands for accountability
and transparency place on individuals. Bourdieu’s work on illusio is drawn upon to understand the
motivations of the field of football.
Findings – The paper finds that calls to “hold the most powerful to account” in practice lack political
force. Thus the case study demonstrates the common (mis)recognition of the term of accountability.
The ability to correct the abuses of the most powerful requires power.
Originality/value – The conflation of Bourdieu and Lacan adds to understanding of accountability
as an empty cipher with performative power.
Keywords Accountability, Football, Bourdieu, Lacan, Manchester United, Transparency,
Management power, Management accountability
Paper type Case study
With football, by contrast, there can be outbreaks of angry populism, as supporters revolt
against the corporate fat cats who muscle in on their clubs; but for the most part football these
days is the opium of the people, not to speak of their crack cocaine. Its icon is the impeccably
Tory, slavishly conformist Beckham. The Reds are no longer the Bolsheviks. Nobody serious
about political change can shirk the fact that the game has to be abolished. And any political
outfit that tried it on would have about as much chance of power as the chief executive of BP
has in taking over from Oprah Winfrey (Eagleton, 2010)
This paper is concerned with a significant cultural form – football[1]. It considers
accountability in football and uses the recent take-over of Manchester United football
club by Malcolm Glazer in order to highlight some of the accountability issues which
are at stake on the field in order to problematize the sign more generally. Accordingly it
concentrates on English football[2]. The cultural importance of football in England is
highly significant. Football is the national sport and aggregate attendance at Premier
League matches in 2007/2008 was 13,736,623 (All Parliamentary Football Group, 2009).
If there is any field where there is a huge desire for information, control and
“accountability”, it is the field of football. Unlike any other field, the fans’ desire is
almost overwhelming. Having such intensely interested participants makes the field of
football an interesting case for considering the meaning(s) of accountability and how
our understandings of the word operate in practice.
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
www.emeraldinsight.com/0951-3574.htm
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The everyday use of the word “accountability” increased dramatically in the late
twentieth and early twenty-first century and this growth is evaluated in light of what
Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001) describe as a “new vocabulary” or planetary vulgate[3].
This new vocabulary includes such words as “globablisation”, “exclusion”, “minority”
and “new economy”. Following Bourdieu and Wacquant (2001), this paper will argue
that “accountability” should count as one of the words whose:
[. . .] effects are all the more powerful and pernicious in that it is promoted not only by the
partisans of the neoliberal revolution who, under cover of “modernization”, intend to remake
the world by sweeping away the social and economic conquests of a century of social
struggles, henceforth depicted as so many archaisms and obstacles to the emergent new
order, but also by cultural producers (researchers, writers and artists) and left-wing activists,
the vast majority of whom still think of themselves as progressives.
Thus the paper argues that accountability has become a vulgate word in that it
appears to be progressive but in practice has taken on multiple meanings such that it
lacks political force.
This paper draws insights from the theoretical perspectives of Pierre Bourdieu and
Jacques Lacan. Building on the Lacanian understanding of humans as decentred
subjects, we set out to explore how vulgate versions of accountability presents some
actors with delusions of mastery and control while at the same time rendering other
actors individualised and stressed and the whole of society flailing with a concept
which promises much and delivers nothing. Bourdieu’s concept of a field is used in
order to set a boundary around English football. Bourdieu conceptualized a field as a
social arena in which people manoeuvre and struggle in pursuit of desirable resources.
Those who are most likely to come out on top in a particular field will possess the
requisite forms of capital. On the field of football, for example, those who are likely to
reach the highest echelons have high embodied cultural capital – they are the highly
skilled football players and managers. Of course, those with high economic capital can
attempt to reach the top of the field by buying cultural capital[4] (Forrest and Simmons,
2000). Participants on fields suffer from what Bourdieu described as illusio. For
Bourdieu, illusio means to be involved, “taken in the game” and to admit that a special
social game (like football) has sense and that its stakes are important and worthy of
being pursued (Garrigou, 2006).
The paper is structured as follows. The next section sets out what it considers to be
two important moments in the late twentieth century embrace of the word
accountability to gesture towards possible underpinnings for society’s adoption of the
word. The following section discusses the theoretical word of Lacan and Bourdieu and
the fusion and differences between the two. It is argued that, although coming from
different academic fields, each of them is concerned with the way in which actors are
constituted as subjects and how this leaves actors constantly desiring recognition. The
importance of this for helping to understand accountability is that an individual’s
desire is moulded and structured by the desires of those she identifies with. The paper
then turns to the insights which psychoanalytic theory can add to our understanding of
the psychopathology of the demands for accountability and transparency on
organisational actors. Finally we turn to our study of English football and the Glazer
takeover of Manchester United. We use the study to discuss three different elements of
accountability in so far as they impact on the field of football. At the end we offer some
conclusions and potential ways forward.
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The vulgate (managerial) form of accountability
The term accountability is used increasingly and in many different contexts. A simple
search of the term accountability in Nexis showed an increase in the use of the word by
over 1,000 per cent in the press (see Table I). While it is beyond the scope of the paper to
discuss the genesis of the word accountability, we see two movements which have
impacted on our late twentieth century embrace and reconstitution of the word. The
first of these is the apparent success of a management consultant model designed to
control divisional (decentralised) performance in rapidly expanding corporations. John
Roberts suggests that McKinsey & Company (management consultants) set out a very
basic divisional performance measure which would serve to “control” divisions – they
had to produce a 20 per cent return each year or else the division would be closed and
the CEO lose their job (http://apira2010.econ.usyd.edu.au/plenary_speakers/APIRA_
Plenary_John_Roberts.pdf). The terminology used in this arrangement was that the
divisions’ CEOs were rendered accountable to the head office through this simple
performance measure. Apparently, every division made the required return.
Contemporaneous with the “success” of the McKinsey accountability-model, was the
fixation by some elements of the state on private sector exemplars (see Pallot, 2003 for
a description of this in the New Zealand context). This led to the second movement in
which national and local governments (on the advice of management consultants)
began to use performance measures within their own bureaucratic structures adopting
the same rhetoric of accountability. By using this form of “accountability” Government
Ministers could “render their departments accountable” by requiring the production of
performance metrics which could be used both to demonstrate the managerial prowess
of the individual Minister and to demonstrate his/her accountability to the general
public. Perhaps more importantly, government departments and parts of the state
sector could be privatized on the basis that the newly privatized organizations, would
Year Total Newspapers % newspapers
1990 7,473 4,325 57.9
1991 8,805 5,368 61.0
1992 11,183 7,140 63.8
1993 13,748 8,729 63.5
1994 16,248 11,346 69.8
1995 22,178 14,634 66.0
1996 26,715 17,532 65.6
1997 35,128 21,062 60.0
1998 47,404 23,472 49.5
1999 56,525 26,776 47.4
2000 64,641 32,650 50.5
2001 63,782 31,630 49.6
2002 77,099 38,130 49.5
2003 75,870 38,006 50.1
2004 89,594 42,359 47.3
2005 98,289 41,398 42.1
2006 107,286 47,840 44.6
2007 135,133 48,771 36.1
2008 134,408 46,582 34.7
2009 165,449 52,360 31.6
Table I.
Annual Nexis hits for the
word “accountability”
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be as accountable as the state sector, through the production of the same performance
metrics as their state counterparts (Catchpowle et al., 2004; Cole and Cooper, 2005, 2006;
Cooper and Taylor, 2005). A fair definition of this form of accountability was suggested
by Barton (2006) who said that it would consist of “accounting for, reporting on,
explaining and justifying activities and accepting responsibility for the outcomes”
(Sinclair, 1995, p. 257)[5].
The “managerial” or vulgate form of accountability set out above became
increasingly commonplace in the public sphere through discourses concerning public
sector reform (see for example Gendron et al., 2001; Jacobs, 2000; Pallot, 2003; Pashang,
2003; Steccolini, 2004; Mulgan, 2000), although Dubnick, 2002, p. 21, argues that its
manipulation as a term of rhetoric and “reform” has resulted in the concept being
sapped of “its meaning and value as an important term of governance.” Moreover, the
use of “McKinsey” style accountability has spread globally. It has been at the forefront
of public sector reform internationally in spite of the fact that it does not have an
equivalent in other European languages. The problem of “incommensurability”, where
a lack of common language inhibits easy translation of the word across contexts and
cultures (Dubnick, 2002, p. 4) has not impeded its progress as the standard bearer for
neo-liberal reforms.
In the twenty-first century, accountability has become a kind of cure-all for the
problems associated with managing complex environments (Dubnick, 2002, p. 5) or at
least of giving the appearance of doing so. When it comes to government or business
accountability to citizens, there has been a subtle shift from the McKinsey model, in
that while performance metrics (for example in the form of hospital waiting lists,
school league tables and rail delays) may be presented to citizens, they have no power
to remove the heads of (for example) the privatised utilities that fail to meet
expectations. But that does not mean that “accountability” per se can be so easily
dismissed. While the rhetoric of accountability has served to throw a veil over
corporate and state activities (hiding behind a few chosen performance measures),
rendering the citizenry quiescent; there is another side to accountability in terms of its
impact on organisational actors. Managerial forms of accountability impact on
organisational actors in profound psychopathetic ways and can distort organisational
performance. This “individual” aspect of accountability is the concern of writers who
take a more psychoanalytic approach to accountability. Such writers base their work
on the, rather different, understanding that accountability and account giving are part
of what it is to be a “rational individual” (Douglas, 1994). The next section draws on the
work of Bourdieu and Lacan, to set out the theoretical underpinnings for a
psychoanalytic approach to individual accountability.
Bourdieu, Lacan and the recognition of the Other
This paper takes an unusual theoretical perspective through its use and fusion of the
theoretical concepts of Pierre Bourdieu and Jacques Lacan. Steinmetz (2006) argues
that although Bourdieu is frequently seen as a theorist who will have no truck with
Freudian psychoanalytic theory (on which much of Lacan’s work was based), he
seemed to recognise in the last decade of his life that psychoanalysis was intrinsic to
his own project (see also Witz, 2004). Steinmetz (2006) points out that Bourdieu,
describes sociology and psychoanalysis as different, complementary approaches to the
same object:
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This is not the place to question the relation between the mode of exploring subjectivity
proposed here and that practiced by psychoanalysis. But, at the very least, it is necessary to
guard against thinking of these relationships as alternatives to each other. Sociology does not
claim to substitute its mode of explanation for that of psychoanalysis; it is concerned only to
construct differently certain givens that psychoanalysis also takes as its object . . . . (Bourdieu,
1999, cited in Steinmetz, 2006, p. 446).
Lacan posits a useful model for the process by which the amorphic, desire-driven
human infant is socialised to assume its adult role and be able to recognise others,
although the Lacanian conception of Western subjects is an uncomfortable one (Lacan,
1975, 1977, 1994). In total contradiction to the traditional agency theoretic, Lacan sets
out a case that people are insecure, anxious, desiring, contradictory, socially
constructed subjects whose prime desires are for security through recognition and the
feeling of control. Lacan explains how people are constituted as “decentred/split”
subjects by building on the work of Freud and setting out overlapping phases of
childhood development. These phases are when the child acquires language and when
a child recognises that it is separate from its mother – the mirror stage.
On acquiring language, children learn more than simple “words for things”
(signifiers with direct association to referents). Signifiers are linked to the referents
through signifieds or concepts (de Saussure, 1959). So for example, when a child learns
the word “friend”, this word commonly connotes “a good person”, “someone that we
know”, “can trust” and so on. Moreover, the child also learns certain culturally specific
“rules” about friends, how they should be treated differently from strangers, where we
may touch them, address them and so on. Lacan describes the acquisition of language
as internalising the symbolic order. Lacan’s symbolic order is the way in which
societies are regulated by a series of signs, roles, and rituals which have meaning only
in relation to each other, forming recognizable codes and expressed in language. The
symbolic phase of development is important for the functioning of society. Society
functions more smoothly (if unfairly) as long as we all abide by and understand the
rules. At the same time as the child unconsciously internalises these sets of rules of
language and behaviours she/he is produced by them at the level of the unconscious.
Thus, on acquiring language, we “accept” a symbolic order which is already in
place. This means that we are not intentional subjects in control of our own destiny.
We cannot decide rationally and independently what is “good” and what is not,
because on acquiring language we accept a symbolic order which is already in place. In
this sense we are not in total control. For this reason, Lacan sets out a case that one of
our primary drives to regain our sense of control.
Bourdieu’s theory too depends on the internalization and embodiment of
hierarchical social relations. Thus Bourdieu’s theory of subject formation closely
tracks Lacan’s incorporation into the symbolic order (Steinmetz, 2006). Bourdieu saw
that mental structures are reinforced by the objective structures. The relationship
between mental and objective structures is not totally arbitrary in Bourdieu’s work.
Bourdieu takes a class/power perspective in which the point of view of the dominant
groups is imposed as the universal point of view (Mahar et al., 1990). To Bourdieu, our
mental structures are strictly controlled by preconceived thematics which to a large
extent are imposed by a broadly defined state (Cooper and Coulson, forthcoming). In
Bourdieu’s work mental structures (or symbolic orders) are reinforced by social
structures.
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To Lacan, a corresponding ego-splitting process to that which occurs on the
acquisition of the symbolic order happens during the “mirror stage”. Desire arrives at
the time when an infant is separated from its mother. The Mother is the first
embodiment of the Other for the child and so synonymous with it. The child learns
language from the Mother and thus acquires her attitudes, rules and assumptions, in
other words the whole Other of the Mother. Contained within the signifiers learned by
the child is the desire of the mother which has been created in turn by the signifiers
she/he has inherited. The desire of the mother as representative of the Other structures
the desire of the child. She is the primary identification for the child. Identification for
Lacan is the process whereby the subject assumes the underlying structure of another.
This identification with many Others continues through life. But the mother is the first
and as such “Primary identification... occurs on the basis of the mother’s omnipotence
[and] makes the satisfaction of needs dependent on the signifying apparatus” (Lacan
cited in Bailly, 2009, p. 68). In this primary identification, the Mother is omnipotent and
because the child identifies so strongly with her, the child assumes it too is omnipotent.
But the mother absents herself – often by necessity – from the child. The Mother
does not respond to the child’s demand therefore there is a realisation that the
“omnipotent” Mother is in fact beyond the child’s control. At times the Mother refuses
to respond to the baby’s demands and this causes anxiety. But this is commensurate
with desire. Through her “absence” the child realises that the mother at times pursues
her own desires. The child then learns to desire this Other – which is not the Mother –
through absence. The only thing the child can see that takes the Mother’s attention
away is the Name of the Father. For Lacan this need not be an actual Father but a
representation – her other role in life such as a job. The absence which causes the
child’s anxiety at the same time brings about its desire for the Other.
Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand is torn from need, this margin
being the one that demand – whose appeal can be unconditional only with respect to the
Other – opens up in the guise of the possible gap need may give rise to here, because it has no
universal satisfaction (this is called “anxiety”) (Lacan, 1977 cited in Bailly, 2009, p. 126).
There can be no satisfaction of need, there is desire and there is anxiety and the two are
always connected. For Lacan, the object cause of desire is also the object of anxiety.
The Other is transmitted in language and as the child will come across many Others,
the individual’s desire is moulded and structured by the desires of those she identifies
with.
As a child acquires language (symbolic order), she also learns to recognise herself in
a “mirror”. Through watching itself in a mirror, the child is able to experience:
[. . .] in play the relation between the movements assumed in the image and the reflected
environment, and between this virtual complex and the reality it reduplicates - the child’s own
body, and the persons and things around him (Lacan, 1977, p. 1).
The “mirror” can be the image or even the voice of another human being, perhaps the
mother or carer (Silverman, 1988; Steinmetz, 2006). In other words, at the mirror stage:
[. . .] the child is alienated from itself by its identification with its mirror image – a false object
onto which it can transfer all the signifiers with which it builds the fiction of its ego. The
dialectic created by the dualities of Subject [the I] and ego allows the formation of the
concepts that can and do attract symbolisation. The “small other perceived in the Mirror
Stage is the idea of self” to which signifiers may attach (Bailly, 2009, p. 71).
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I am “I” but then become “me” through the other – or even “she” as she initially
disassociates from this ego seen in the mirror as she incorporates what “she” then
becomes. Just as the infant of the mirror stage misrecognises (or is oblivious to) itself as
unified and in physical control of itself, so the speaking subject in the symbolic order
misrecognises itself (or is oblivious to) its utterance as one and assumes that it is the
author of meaning (Weedon, 1987).
In an accountability context, Roberts (1991, 2001, 2009) argues that the distinction
between self and other(s) emerges out of a process of seeing and being seen. In “taking
over” the attitudes of others towards herself, partly through the acquisition of
language, the child discovers not only herself but is introduced to the beliefs, values,
rules and injunctions that structure social life. Our awareness of self develops
simultaneously with our awareness of the world and our relation to others. So others’
“reflections” are very important to humans. For us humans it is hard not to identify –
not to keep losing ourselves in the images the world offers us.
Lacan’s anxious human subject, with its imaginary relations and its empty core,
imprinted by the world through language, is far from the notion of true self-identity
and the autonomous, intentional human subject of agency theory (Duchen, 1986). Our
ultimate desire is confirmation of selfhood and the need to feel in control. There are
many ways in which we attempt to confirm self-hood, including, making those we
identify with into “mirrors” by pleasing them, and through reflection by association
with brand names and so on. In Lacanian psychoanalysis desire surmounts and wholly
dominates over the supposedly “basic” needs of the organism. In the end, nothing can
ever truly satisfy (this) desire because no amount of recognition from others can
confirm ones selfhood and we can never be totally in control. Lacan fixes the root of
this problem, not biologically, but in our Western society, which places great emphasis
on the private individual. This unsatisfied desire in Western culture is likely to
provoke aggression, dissatisfaction, destruction and alienation. The desire for
recognition and confirmation drives toward negativity and destruction. The self is not
constructed once and for all but is constantly being remade. Many theorists (Berger
and Luckmann, 1967; Foucault, 1979 and so on) argue that the “self” is socially
produced and reproduced in the routines of everyday interaction (Roberts, 1991).
When Bourdieu addresses the genesis of subjects suited to operate competitively in
social fields, he discusses the transition from self-love (the state prior to the acquisition
of language) to a quite other object of investment, one that inculcates the durable
disposition to invest in the social game. Bourdieu locates the motor shift in this process
in the “search for recognition” (Steinmetz, 2006).
Absorbed in the love of others, the child can only discover others, as such on condition that he
discovers himself as a “subject” for whom there are “objects” whose particularity is that they
can take him as their “object”. In fact, he is continuously led to take the point of view of others
on himself, to adopt their point of view so as to discover and evaluate in advance how he will
be seen and defined by them. His being is being-perceived, condemned to be defined as it
“really” is by the perceptions of others. . . Symbolic capital enables forms of domination
which imply dependence on those who can be dominated by it, since it only exists through the
esteem, recognition, belief, credit and confidence of others (Bourdieu, 1997, p. 166, cited in
Steinmetz, 2006, p. 455).
The interesting question here is whether or not all actors on a field depend on
recognition from all others regardless of whether this is the recognition from a person
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of superior or inferior status. Hegel, for example, would posit reciprocity or
universality in the search for recognition. But does one feel the same sense of
recognition (for example) from those of a lower status? In other words, does Bourdieu’s
concept of symbolic capital require a universalization of the desire for recognition
to/from each of the players in a social field equally? In football terms would Wayne
Rooney (a contemporary Manchester United player and world renowned footballer)
feel the same sense of reflection if, one of the fans told him that he had played
particularly well in a game, as if, (say) Eric Cantona (an elite peer)[6] said the same
thing? Or would Rooney prefer all of the Manchester United fans at Old Trafford to
cheer him off the pitch in preference to a positive comment from Cantona? And would
the situation be different again if Alex Ferguson (Rooney’s manager) expressed
pleasure at Rooney’s play in the game? Clearly there is a difference between Rooney’s
manager and another highly talented player in that his manager has the power to
exclude Rooney from the team and so there is a power dimension to this relationship.
Lacan’s theory of the symbolic order sets out the psychofoundations which permit
the operation of the Bourdieu’s fields and govern the production of subjects equipped
to operate on those fields. The subject’s entry into the Symbolic Order explains the
desire to have one’s cultural capital recognised as well as the recognition by others of
that capital (as wonderful or terrible as with Lacan’s Ego Ideal or punitive superego)
(Steinmetz, 2006). The Ego-ideal is “the network of social-symbolic norms and ideals
that the subject internalizes in the course of his or her education” (Zizek, 2006, p. 80). It
is the “good” cop which has its binary opposite or obverse in the “‘bad’
(irrational-excessive, cruel, anxiety-provoking) Superego” (Zizek, 2006, p. 80).
The symbolic order (and symbolic capital) sets out the hierarchical positions of
actors on a field and thus we would argue that some reflections are more highly valued
than others.
In summary, in this section we posit a characterisation of people as “decentred”
human subjects for whom the loss of selfhood and control is the ultimate fear and the
confirmation of selfhood and control is the ultimate desire (Cooper, 1992)[7]. Subjects
desire recognition and in order to gain positive recognition subjects mould and
structure themselves to “please” those they identify with. We have further discussed if
it is important who serves as a “mirror”, a point to which we will return at the end of
this paper. The accounting literature which has drawn on psychoanalysis to explain
how “managerial” accountability can become a “mirror” in organisational settings
producing unexpected and pathological consequences will be discussed in the next
section.
Accountability and psychoanalytic insights
There are perhaps two fairly distinct academic literatures which are concerned with
accountability. The first, with which this paper has much agreement, broadly argues
that accounting (or the provision of information) is not accountability. This group is
more social constructivist in nature and tend towards more psychoanalytic
conceptions of accountability in which social actors recognise that their actions
impact on others. Work in this arena’s dominant concern is with the adverse impacts of
the “McKinsey/managerial/hierarchical” form of accountability on individuals within
organisations and consequently on organisational performance. The second dominant
group, albeit unconsciously accepting the vulgate version of the term, conflates the
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provision of accounts (in their various forms) with accountability. This is the case, for
example, with many of those who call for organisations to be made more accountable
through the production of (for example) government reports and various forms of
performance metrics like key performance measures, and perhaps social and
environmental accounts. Organisations are called on to be more socially accountable,
yet as Douglas (1987, p. 9) states that while legal theory endows organisations with
fictive personality it does not presume they have an emotional bias. In other words,
from a psychoanalytic perspective, organisations cannot be accountable – only
organisational actors can.
Roberts (1991), draws on the work of various writers who consider the mirror stage
of development (for example Mead, 1934 and Merleau-Ponty, 1962). To Roberts (1991):
Accountability represents the attitudes of others towards us, and in this way both addresses
and immediately confirms us. To be held accountable hence sharpens and clarifies our sense
of self, and provides focus within the stream of experiencing. Accountability does not
however, depend upon the perpetual presence of others towards us, so that accountability
also becomes a process internal to the “self” in the surveillance of the “me” by “I”. (Roberts,
1991, p. 358).
The recognition that our actions have consequences on others is surely important in
any cultural setting. It has been argued that it is “the adhesive that binds social
systems together” (Tetlock, 1985 cited in Frink and Ferris, 1998). However, problems
arise when performance metrics (like output measures) at work are seen as some kind
of ideal which can be grasped as an authoritative recognition of our existence. “I am my
results and I find my own value reflected in them” (Roberts, 1991). It is not surprising
that organizational actors carefully manage the ways in which they are rendered
visible to distant others. As Tsoukas (1997, p. 838) puts it – “management becomes
tantamount to keeping up appearances, and fighting shadows: managing via league
tables leads to managing the league tables themselves.” In short, performance
measures as forms of accountability jeopardize organizational goals (Everett and
Friesen, 2010), produce unintended consequences (Andrew, 2007; Chwastiak, 2006;
Cole and Cooper, 2006; Robinson, 2003), hide certain activities (Collier, 2006), and
disable organizational learning (Fried, 2010).
In an audit setting Power (1997) suggests two possible outcomes for organisations
which use managerial accountability through performance metrics. First, there is what
Power (1997) describes as decoupling. This is where output measures are managed in
such a way as to project the appearance of control externally while leaving actual
operational efficiency untouched. Second, performance measures can colonize an
organization and “penetrate deep into organizational practices”. Colonization brings
the real danger that the “imposition of audit and related measures of audited
performance leads to the opposite of what was intended” (Power, 1997, p. 98).
While performance metrics can impact negatively on organisational performance,
on an individual level, performance measures can make individuals feel isolated and
frustrated. Lacan (1975) would describe this as the “alienation of self.” This is where
individuals aggressively berate themselves for failing to meet ideals. In some people,
this creates the need to find others on whom to project all that is bad or inadequate in
order to protect and preserve their own sense of perfection. Hood (2007) has explored
various forms of transparency and how these interact with “blame avoidance” as a
force that underlies much of political and institutional practice.
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So accountability frequently arouses both longings for love and acceptance and
parallel fears of being attacked and turned on, and I would argue that it is this
emotional edge to accountability that gives it its force. There is something of an
emotional short circuit at work in accountability such that the present comes to be
imbued with these earlier emotional resonances (Roberts, 1991).
Douglas (1994) writes that “accountability” is written into our make-up. We expect
to be held accountable and therefore we seek approval (Douglas, 1994, p. 132). We
cannot exist without addressing and being addressed by the Other (Butler, 2001, p. 25).
Consequently individuals are driven by a need to find approval and status (Frink and
Ferris, 1998). Everyone wants to feel good about themselves as well as having others
hold a good opinion of them. So to be deemed willing to be held accountable for our
actions is one way of achieving this (Douglas, 1994). In Western culture, individuals
construct a sense of themselves as accountable (Sinclair, 1995, p. 220). But what it
means to be accountable is socially constructed and the prevalent vulgate definitions of
accountability based on economic expediency and efficiency have come to dominate
(Blakely, 2003; Mellet, 2002; Modell, 2004; Nath et al., 2005; Pallot, 2003).
Yet while we are all “enmeshed in an elaborating web of accountability” – it
remains elusive (Sinclair, 1995). Merleau-Ponty would argue that when we “don’t have
a word for it,” it is not because language is inadequate, but that the thought is not fully
formed; it is incomplete (Marcoulatas, 2001). The word “accountability” which began
as a spoken word; an utterance which expressed emotional essence to an encounter
with the world; has, through time and frequent misuse or deviation, lost track of that
original character. Consequently it can now act as a cover or veil for incomplete
thoughts. The notion or “mechanics” of accountability in certain situations is not fully
formed but the use of the word conceals these gaps or flaws (Merleau-Ponty, 1962).
What both governments and corporations have managed to achieve is a fac¸ade of
accountability. They claim to be accountable. Vulgate accountability is ill defined, but
is, in its various forms, the exact opposite of a psychoanalytic form of accountability in
which individuals recognise that their activities impact on others.
In the next section we turn to a field, the field of football, in which there is a massive
amount of information produced by and for the participants on the field. Indeed fans
attachment to their teams means that they have an overwhelming desire for
information about the team which they support and to have some form of control over
their teams’ performances on the pitch. The popular press understand this desire and
profit from it. The senior decision makers in clubs also understand this desire (and
profit from it). But the corporate structure of the field means that fans have to struggle
extremely hard for even the smallest amount of “genuine” accountability.
The English field of football
The English field of football is extremely competitive. All fields are sites of struggle
but competitiveness has been built into the structure of the field of football in that it is
hierarchically structured with various leagues and, depending on the league, at the end
of each season, at least one team is relegated and the top team(s) from the division
below take their place(s). The league which dominates English football, the Premier
League (Premiership), was formed as recently as 1992 when the 20 clubs in the top
league of the Football League resigned from that league and established the Premier
League (Premiership) as a private company. Each of the 20 clubs in the Premiership
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own a share in the Premier League and at the summer AGM of the Premiership, each of
the three relegated clubs[8] transfer their ordinary share to the three promoted clubs.
The reason for the 20-club breakaway was financial. The newly formed Premier
League company was free to negotiate its own broadcasting and sponsorship
agreements. This proved to be extremely lucrative for the clubs involved
(www.premierleague.com/page/Home/0,12306,00.html). The initial deal with Sky TV
was worth £191m over five years. The effect of the creation of a new league with its
own broadcasting rights was profound. Before lucrative TV deals, the dominant
income stream for clubs was ticket sales. If a club was relegated, it may have attracted
fewer supporters to its games, and perhaps slightly lower ticket prices, but ticket
revenues would not have fallen substantially. With the advent of TV revenue,
relegated clubs would face reduced ticket revenues alongside the loss of the huge
Premiership TV revenues. This means that relegation from the Premiership is
financially horrific and this has become increasingly the case since the amount paid by
TV companies has increased dramatically such that to televise matches from
2007-2010, Sky and Setanta paid the Premiership £1.7bn.
The teams in the Premiership are either private or public limited companies. In spite
of huge TV revenues, each club was until recently heavily in debt (The Independent,
2010), although their debts take various forms. Several clubs have bank loans, some
have entered the bond market and issued securities secured on club assets, while others
have soft loans from their owners with low or zero rates of interest. The Chelsea and
Manchester City owners have recently written off their soft loans of £701m and £305m
respectively (www.independent.co.uk/sport/football/premier-league/the-debt-league-
how-much-do-clubs-owe-1912244.html). Portsmouth (a club relegated from the
Premiership in 2009/2010) has gone into administration and it appears from their
accounts that the clubs without super-rich benefactors are facing serious financial
difficulties. As private or public companies, football clubs are subject to UK Company
law. They are also subject to the specific rules of the field (although see Cooper and
Joyce, 2009) which are set by a complex network of bodies including the Football
Association Board (FA), the Football Regulatory Authority (FRA), the Premier League,
the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and the Fe´de´ration
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA).
The field of football has a strong homologous relation to the economic field since the
major clubs are public or private companies, as is the Premier League Company. It
would, however, be inaccurate to equate the field of football to the economic field more
generally. Two key features mark out the field of football. The first is the very specific
form of cultural capital (football skill) which teams need in order to win matches, the
second is the habitus and illusio of the field’s participants. As we will see the structure
of the field in terms of revenue generation and cost of acquiring requisite cultural
capital means that there is a growing (perhaps unbridgeable) divide between those at
the top and the rest.
The first key feature of the field is the importance of cultural capital (skill). While
fans may argue the merits of certain players, there is no doubt that players and
managers with high cultural capital and a “feel for the game” make a difference to the
results of the team (Bourdieu, 1990). Players with high cultural capital can command
extremely high wages. For the majority of elite European football clubs, wages
represent over 50 per cent of turnover (Deloitte, 2010). Players’ wages have increased
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significantly since 1995 partly because of the “Bosman ruling”. This ruling came about
as a result of three related court cases brought by Jean-Marc Bosman, a Belgian
footballer in the Jupiler League in Belgium[9]. At the end of his contract with RFC
Liege, Bosman wanted to move to Dunkerque, a French team. Dunkerque did not offer
Liege a large enough transfer fee, so Liege refused to let Bosman move. Liege also
reduced Bosman’s wages at this time. Bosman took his case to the European High
Court where it was held that existing transfer rules were in breach of EU law on the
free movement of workers between member states. Thus prior to the Bosman-ruling, a
player could not leave unless his club agreed to let him go, even if he was out of
contract. Bosman won his case in 1995 and since then players have been free to leave
their clubs as soon as their contracts have expired. Transfer fees for out-of-contract
players became illegal where a player was moving between one EU nation and another.
Currently, only players still serving contracts with their teams can have transfer fees
paid for them.
The Bosman ruling also brought another significant change in European football.
Prior to the Bosman case, quota systems existed in many national leagues and also in
the UEFA club competitions. The quota systems meant that only a limited number of
foreign players could play in a particular match. For example, in the UEFA club
competitions, only three foreign players (plus two “assimilated” foreign players) could
play for a team. So Bosman brought about a more internationally active market for
football players.
The implications of the Bosman case were far-reaching for football across Europe. It
altered the structure of the field. In short, it gave the best players more power and thus
higher remuneration. In practice, the clubs which receive substantial TV income are
the only ones who can afford to match the best players’ newly-inflated salaries. In the
football season 2008/2009 the wages paid by the five top European Leagues (England,
France, Germany, Italy and Spain) increased by 6 per cent to exceed e5 bn (Deloitte,
2010). The wage bill of the English Premier League is £1.2bn (Deloitte, 2010).
In 2008/2009 broadcasting was the biggest contributor to Premiership club
revenues at 49 per cent of total revenues (Deloitte, 2010). Television revenue
disproportionately favours the clubs at the top of the field. European club football is
increasingly polarised in terms of television revenues. Europe’s 20 top revenue
generating clubs earned over e3.9 bn in 2008/2009, 25 per cent of the entire European
football market. These 20 clubs belong to a select group of teams that are allowed to
participate in a pan-European competition, “The UEFA Champions’ League” (in
addition to these club’s other competitions) and thus receive significant additional
television revenues[10]. The top four clubs in the Premiership automatically qualify to
play in the Champion’s League and so these clubs are automatically at a financial
advantage. These clubs also benefit from the fact that TV revenue diminishes
according to Premiership rankings at the end of each season. These two factors mean
that the TV revenue spread is six times between the top and bottom club in the
Premiership (Deloitte, 2010).
The significant extra revenue awarded to the top clubs mean that they can buy the
best players, win the competitions that allow them to participate in the UEFA
Champions’ League, and thus receive more money, to buy even better players. The top
clubs operate in a “victorious-cycle” such that the five major European leagues are each
dominated by a few clubs. In England, since the creation of the Premiership, a total of
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44 clubs have played at various times in the league, of these, only four clubs have won
(Manchester United 12, Arsenal 3, Chelsea 3, Blackburn Rovers 1). Aside from unequal
revenue for television, the field is also distorted by a few multi-millionaire “investors”
who have paid significant amounts of money to acquire and maintain football
clubs[11]. The combination of higher wages and television revenues (alongside
multi-millionaire owners) concentrated in the hands of a few clubs makes the struggle
to survive in the Premiership extremely difficult; paradoxically, it is perhaps as
stressful for the teams which are struggling to remain at the top.
While the specific form of cultural capital which enable clubs to reach the top of the
field mark out the field of football as unique, the aspect of the field which makes it most
unique is the fans. Football fans are not like “customers” of other businesses in the
sense that they cannot move their business to a competitor. Equally, unlike
“customers” their wishes or requirements are less likely to be considered by business
owners as their “business” is somewhat taken for granted since fans who become
totally disillusioned with their clubs will not switch to another club (Whelan, 1996).
While there are significant numbers of fans who participate on the field of football, it
would be a mistake to see them as a homogeneous group (Kuper and Szymanski, 2010).
Some are “genuinely faithful through thick-and-thin,” but some are more transient in
nature. Kuper and Szymanski (2010) present studies into football attendees which
explain the percentage of football fans who will buy a season ticket irrespective of how
successful the club is. One of the most in-depth academic research reports on fans is the
Social Issues Research Centre report (The Social Issues Research Centre, Football
Passions (2008))[12]. In compiling the report, researchers monitored the heart rate of
fans at games. They discovered extreme emotional feelings at football games. Indeed
such is the intensity of the experience of going to a match, that it was found that
two-thirds of fans have cried at football games. Banyard and Shevlin (2001) measured
the level of psychological distress caused to supporters of a football team which was
relegated from the English Premier League. They found that the impact of relegation is
psychologically significant, likening it to post traumatic stress syndrome. Of all those
who would describe themselves as a fan, 25 per cent said football was one of the most
important things in their lives[13]. Research has shown that through association with
their team’s success, fans “bask in reflected glory.” (Branscombe and Wann, 1991). If
one accepts the Lacanian position that people are anxious subjects constantly desiring
self reflection and recognition by others, it is not difficult to see why people wish to
associate themselves with a football team which holds out the false promise of filling
our empty cores with very powerful images. Fans emotional ties to their teams are very
strong.
The Lacanian subject’s desire to control is also exemplified in the Football Passions
report. In the Football Passions report fans described themselves as the “twelfth man”
– as essential to the success of the team as the players and coaching staff. The fans
believe that their actions during the game – the ritual chants, songs, banner waving
and so on – motivate the team and intimidate opposition players and perhaps even
influence referees’ decisions. They seem to genuinely believe that they must attend the
game “to help the team win”, not just to observe the event. Pre and post-match rituals
are important to fans and exemplify their need to feel in control. These rituals are more
than just meeting before the game for a few drinks – they frequently involve wearing
“lucky” clothes, singing certain songs, getting up at a certain stage in the game to buy a
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pie and so on. Football also plays a key role in family life in much of Europe by linking
the shared experience of family members across generations and creating a lasting
sense of belonging and tradition. Football fans also demonstrate a considerable
financial commitment (The Social Issues Research Centre, Football Passions, 2008).
In this section we have argued that there are two unique aspects to the field of
football. The first is financial/structural. The field is structured to be competitive, it is
financially unequal in terms of the ability to acquire the requisite cultural capital to
participate on the field and its dominant clubs take the corporate form. Partially for
these reasons, the field is burdened with large financial debts. The second major aspect
of the field is the fans. While fans can in no sense be considered to be a homogeneous
group, they are marked out by their shared illusio. Fans’ passion for the game and their
desire to be in control has led them to use the language of vulgate accountability. They
demand both information and would like a say in the running of their clubs. We
discuss the form which accountability takes in the field of football in the next section.
Transparency and accountability in football
It has been argued that in the mid 1980s football supporters began to demand a more
active role in the running of their clubs (Whelan, 1996). The Football Supporters
Association (FSA) was formed in 1985 with an aim of securing supporter
representation at every level of the game. There are many other football supporters
groups, for example, The Football Supporters Federation which hosts an annual Fans’
Parliament Conference, the Fans Network, the Soccer Fans Network and the Football
Fans Census which was founded in England in 2002 to help make sure that fans were
put in the heart of the game’s decision-making processes by providing a
communication channel between fans and decision makers through ongoing
research, consultation and reports. Every premiership club will have several official
and unofficial supporters clubs throughout the world.
The passionate desire to control and for reflection in their teams produces, on the
part of fans, an insatiable demand for information (transparency) about their teams.
The web is regularly used by fans through their discussion forums to demand
accountability from senior figures at their clubs. In spite of the overwhelming amount
of sources of information available to them, a passing glance at fans’ internet forums
will show that fans do not, on the whole, feel that clubs are transparent (nor respect
their position as fans). Premiership clubs have their own web pages which contain
information about all aspects of the club. These are updated regularly with several
news items per day. The web sites of the top clubs also have media streams containing
daily “news programmes” and interviews with key figures in the club. Many of the
(official and unofficial) supporters’ clubs also have sites which are frequently updated
with news and discussion pieces, these sites also contain discussion forums. Aligned to
this there are a myriad of other web sites (such as those of TV companies and major
newspapers) which are regularly updated with the latest football “news”. The 44th
most popular web site in the world (the 6th most popular web site in the UK) is the BBC
sport/football webpage (www.alexa.com/siteinfo/news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/
default.stm#). Newspapers in the UK dedicate whole pages to football and TV
station news broadcasts retain a permanent slot for sports news, which on the majority
of occasions means football news. Historically newspapers were very important and
the longest standing relationship of football clubs with any form of the media is with
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newspapers (Vamplew, 1988). In spite of the internet, newspapers are still significant
(Crolley and Hand, 2002), indeed they have increased their coverage of football (Davies,
2005; Morrow, 2003). Table II sets out the growing interest in the press for stories about
Manchester United. Aside from this there are two BBC radio stations (5 Live, and 5 Live
Sports extra) which are mainly dedicated to sport and many other stations which have
whole programmes in which listeners can call in and air their views on their teams.
Fans are also able to access the annual report and accounts of their clubs through
Companies House or are sent these reports as shareholders of their clubs. Although a
study by Morrow (2005) of narrative reporting in accounts of football clubs perhaps
unsurprisingly found selectivity in disclosure and of image management. Morrow
found that the narrative disclosure on several variables was highly skewed towards
positive commentary, with the emphasis on good news such as improved television
deals but with little or no prominence given to information such as disproportionate
increases in wages and salary costs.
Thus there appears to be a significant amount of information from many media
sources and from the clubs themselves freely available to sate the appetite of
passionate football fans. The rhetoric of accountability has been used by the key
players on the field. For example, the governing body of English football’s document,
Governance: A Guide for Football Clubs (2005)[14], uses the term accountability:
Good governance (i.e. good leadership, direction and control) is essential for a football club to
be managed effectively and to demonstrate accountability and transparency.
This is a good example of vulgate accountability[15]. Its meaning is fuzzy and centred
on politically (in the broader sense) motivated “woolly and spongy debate” (Bourdieu
and Wacquant, 1999 p. 42).
The fans’ desire for the provision of information and some kind of control over the
decision makers and football’s governing bodies has been rhetorically supported by
government ministers. Gerry Sutcliffe (the then Minister for sport), is reported as
saying, “We want to see greater supporter representation in the running of football
clubs and far greater accountability” (The Guardian, 2010). Before it lost the 2010
election, the New Labour government backed the creation of Supporters Direct, an
initiative which gives advice and support to fans looking to get involved in the running
of their clubs. The Supporters Direct mission statement states that:
Year Total Newspapers % newspapers
2000 55,644 46,152 82.9
2001 72,822 61,367 84.3
2002 84,340 70,556 83.7
2003 90,895 76,763 84.5
2004 85,038 70,452 82.8
2005 84,582 69,193 81.8
2006 80,720 66,371 82.2
2007 103,639 80,740 77.9
2008 117,048 85,074 72.7
2009 134,167 98,783 73.6
Table II.
Annual Nexis hits for
“Manchester United”
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Through establishing and developing supporters’ trusts, we aim to bring about responsible,
democratic representation at spectator sports clubs, and so help promote the highest
standards of governance, accountability and embed those clubs deeper into their
communities.
The All Party Football Group Inquiry Panel (2009) report, looking at what it described
as “Transparency and Accountability”, stated that:
Any business worth its salt will have a strong, robust CSR programme which reflects their
duties and responsibilities to their stakeholders. This is something that is evident throughout
football, for example the Premier League requires each club to produce a customer charter
which sets out its policy in relation to many aspects including supporters and stakeholders. It
also requires these to be made available and they are easily accessible, generally published on
club websites. They also have to provide the Premier League with an annual report on how
their stated policies have been implemented and to what extent they have been achieved (All
Party Football Group Inquiry Panel, 2009, p. 3).
Thus the “official” Statist version of accountability is in line with the vulgate
accountability outlined earlier in the paper. In order to interrogate the practice of this
form of managerial accountability on the field of football we concentrate on one of the
world’s most famous clubs, Manchester United Football Club (MU). The front page of
the Manchester United Football Club Charter, reads as follows:
Club Charter, Policies & Survey Reports
The first edition of the Club Charter was issued a few years ago when, in line with all other
members of the FA Premier League we published a clear indication of what our policies were
on a number of issues - namely our consultation processes, ticketing, membership benefits,
community activities, merchandising, standards of staff conduct and our complaints
procedure.
"I believe it is appropriate that we regularly review our Charter and the new edition will soon
be available for you to download and read."
"If you would prefer to receive a copy of the Charter and the Club’s policy statements via
email, please send your name and address to enquiries@manutd.co.uk We will be happy to
forward the documents to you." David Gill
The Charter is broken down into several elements including, Disability Discrimination
Policy, Disabled Supporters, Environmental Policy, Equal Opportunities Policy,
Safeguarding Children Policy, Fan Satisfaction Survey Report 2004 – Feedback, Fan
Satisfaction Survey Report 2003 – Feedback, Health and Safety Environment, People
Philosophy, Safety and Energy.
The Manchester United (MU) football club charter which sets out certain
“information” can be considered to be an exemplar of vulgate accountability towards
the fans. There could be a “performative” aspect to the MU charter but in the main it
sets out MU’s policies. In terms of potential sanctions by the fans towards the club, the
Charter seems to be fairly impotent. In the next section, we consider an episode in the
history of MU, which the majority of fans and the board tried to oppose in order to tests
the limits of a vulgate form of accountability.
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Manchester United football club (MU)
Brief history
Manchester United Football Club (MU) was formed in 1878. As many clubs at the time,
it grew from a works team, in MU’s case from the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway
(L&YR) depot. At that time, it was called Newton Heath L&YR Football Club. The club
became independent from the rail depot and joined The Football League’s Second
Division as Newton Heath Football Club in 1892. The name was changed again in 1902
to Manchester United. The club suffered mixed fortunes over the years but, with the
appointment of (Sir) Matt Busby as manager, the team nicknamed “the Busby Babes”
were the first English football club to participate in a European competition in 1957.
For many the club became embedded in the emotional psyche because of “the Munich
air disaster” in which the team plane crashed when attempting to take off in atrocious
weather conditions after refuelling on the runway of Munich airport in February 1958.
It resulted in 28 fatalities including the death of eight players. The consequent rallying
and rebuilding of the team engendered great warmth of feeling towards the club as it
encapsulated a particular post war zeitgeist. MU has since had many iconic players
including Eric Cantona, David Beckham and the most charismatic of all, George Best.
MU has grown to become one of the biggest, and arguably the most famous, football
clubs in the world[16] with a brand image which crosses borders and continents.
Children in some of the remotest parts of the world will know of Manchester United. In
2010, Forbes placed MU as the world’s most valuable football club, a position it has
maintained for six years (www.forbes.com/2010/04/21/soccer-value-teams-business-
sports-soccer-10-intro.html accessed 8/4/11).
MU became a public company in 1990 and was floated on the stock exchange in
1991. The potential havoc which flotation could cause to MU did not go without
comment – “What will the board do to avoid a takeover?” Sir Roy Gardner was asked
at his first MU annual general meeting in 2001. “There’s no need,” came the reply.
“Manchester United is a well-run plc, so there would be no point in a takeover.”
(Michie, 2005, p. 26). However, in 2003, a tempestuous (and unforeseen) take-over
battle began.
The Glazer takeover
In September and October 2003 press reports suggested that there was a battle for
control and ownership of MU. A US citizen, Malcolm Glazer increased his shareholding
to 8.9 per cent, at the same time that BSkyB sold its 10 per cent stake in the club to
MU’s largest shareholders, JP McManus and John Magnier who held 23.2 per cent of
the shares (Wray and Hume, 2003). By December 2003, Glazer’s stake had risen to 14
per cent (Treanor, 2003). As a public company, the board could do little about the ebb
and flow of shareholders at this level. But the board would have been interested (if not
concerned) at Glazer’s activities. It was reported that David Gill, the Manchester United
Chief Executive, confirmed that he had finally been granted an audience with Glazer in
Florida. Gill reported back that, “It was a very useful and constructive dialogue. They
subsequently indicated to us that they viewed Manchester United as a good
investment, full stop. That is the situation,” (Treanor, 2003). By June 2004, Glazer’s
stake had risen to 19.17 per cent. This move encouraged much speculation about the
intentions of Glazer, especially since it did not appear that he had enough money to
make an outright bid for Manchester United (Pratley, 2004a). The intentions of Glazer
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became clearer in October 2004 when press reports stated that he was expected to try
to persuade the Manchester United board to recommend a highly leveraged offer.
Glazer hoped to secure the support of the board members in the face of stiff opposition
from the club’s fans – many of whom were shareholders. Glazer needed the backing of
the Manchester United board because he required access to crucial financial
information to put together the financing for his deal. Without this information, Glazer
would have been unable to convince banks to loan him the money for a take-over bid.
Although, at this stage, the Glazer family had not publicly acknowledged their interest
in the club or the price they were prepared to pay (Treanor and Taylor, 2004).
At this early stage in Glazer’s moves surrounding Manchester United, fans
understood the problems which a leveraged buy-out (LBO) would create for
Manchester United and began to organise into groups and to protest. A fans group
called on Gill to urge the Mergers and Acquisitions’ regulator to impose a deadline on
Glazer to make his intensions clear (Pratley, 2004b). The fans organised around two
main protest groups, Shareholders United (later renamed the Manchester United
Supporters Trust) and the Independent Manchester United Supporters Association.
They planned a series of protests as far afield as the USA where Glazer owned a NFL
team, the Tampa Bay Buccaneers. Oliver Houston, a spokesman for the Shareholders
United pressure group, which backed the protests, is reported as saying:
United’s team are famous for their policy that the best form of defence is attack, and that goes
for the supporters too. This is not an ordinary company he is dealing with; this is people’s
lives. We will not sit back and allow this to happen and I’ve no doubt we will see extreme
public demonstrations, not only in Manchester but in Florida too (Taylor, 2004).
Supporters took their protests to the MU ground, Old Trafford, where two supporters
were ejected when they tried to unveil a huge banner, “United Not for Sale”, in front of
the directors’ box. Vasco Wackrill, of the Independent Manchester United Supporters’
Association, said:
We don’t want our club to be the plaything of a single individual, Glazer has been likened to a
Roman Abramovich[17]-type figure, but he is having to borrow millions to fund his bid and is
essentially mortgaging our future. We think it’s inevitable that with him in charge there will
be increased ticket prices and exploitation of the supporters. He is extremely unpopular with
the Tampa Bay supporters and one way or another he will get the message that he is not
wanted here.
The MU supporters also instigated a campaign known as “Green and Gold” in
reference to the original MU colours in 1878. To this day, many MU fans wear green
and gold scarves as opposed to the modern day colours of red and white.
The rest of 2004 saw an elaborate pantomime being played out. The press reported
that Glazer tried to appease the fans by announcing that Alex Ferguson (the manager)
would be offered a long-term contract if his bid was successful (Rawling, 2004). The
two largest MU shareholders, JP McManus and John Magnier, held enough shares (28.9
per cent) to block Glazer’s take-over attempt unless Glazer could purchase 29 per cent
of the shares. Stock Exchange rules stated that shareholdings over 29 per cent trigger
an automatic take-over bid. Another millionaire, Keith Harris, a City banker and ardent
MU supporter, pursued a plan to prevent Malcolm Glazer taking over the club by
asking Japanese bank Nomura to help give the fans a greater say in any takeover battle
(Treanor, 2004).
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In November 2004, JP Morgan, Glazer’s main financial backer, dropped him while
Brunswick, Glazer’s public relations adviser, and Allen & Overy, his lawyers, also
resigned. The reason given for this in the press was that Glazer, in a tempestuous
shareholders meeting at Old Trafford, used his shares to vote three directors off of the
board. JP McManus and John Magnier, did not vote and are understood to have resisted
pleas from the United directors to break their usual stance of abstention and back the
board instead. After an emergency meeting at Old Trafford the four remaining board
members – Gill, Nick Humby, Ian Much and the chairman Sir Roy Gardner – issued a
strongly worded statement in which they described themselves as “very disappointed”
and effectively accused Glazer’s company of holding the club to ransom.
“It is important all shareholders know the background,” the club stated. “On October 25 we
announced the board had undertaken discussions with the Glazer family’s advisers in
relation to the potential capital structure and the outline business plan that would be used to
support an offer.
At that time, the board stated it would not support any offer and terminated discussions.
Although the Glazer family were well aware of the board’s position they continued to press
for access to confidential information and made it clear that if they were not granted the
ability to carry out due diligence they would vote against certain resolutions at the AGM
(Pratley and Taylor, 2004, p. 8)
In 2005, the whole saga began again. This time Glazer appeared with new bankers NM
Rothschild and in February, Glazer made a formal transfer proposal to MU (Pratley
and Taylor, 2005). By May 2005, Glazer had won[18]. He acquired 75 per cent of the
club through a leveraged buy-out which involved three tranches of investment. £265m
of debt from JP Morgan, (secured against the stadium), £272m in equity from the
Glazer family (mainly consisting of shares they already owned), and then £275m in the
form of special preference shares (so called pay-in-kind or PIK loans) which were
placed among a group of institutions – Citadel, Och-Ziff and Perry Capital (Pratley,
2005). The group of hedge-fund investors which provided the £275m attached special
penalties to the loan. One was that these investors would win special rights over
Glazer’s shareholding unless he paid them back in full – and with interest – by
August 2010. The interest on this debt was more expensive than the going rate – up to
20 per cent a year (Murphy, 2005). The directors of MU who had expressed concerns
about the Glazer take-over received large windfall payments. The Chief Executive
David Gill would receive a £1.7m windfall after the remuneration committee said that
long-term payments could be given. This is on top of the cash that they would receive
from selling shares to Michael Glazer (Tomlinson, 2005). Glazer’s three sons were
placed on the MU board (Taylor, 2005). In short, in spite of significant organised
activity on the part of fans and some of the Manchester United board, Glazer succeeded
in his leveraged buy-out of MU. Next we turn to the amount of debt this created.
Spiralling debt
While MU won the Premiership in 2007, its borrowings were at the highest level ever.
A club which only a few years earlier had been totally free of debt had to service
£663m with interest of £62m (Conn, 2007). The structure of this debt meant that Glazer
was keen to refinance. In 2010 he pursued a £500 million “junk”[19] bond issue. The
issue raised £504 million in two tranches – £250m at 8.75 per cent and $425m at 8.375
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per cent. The club said that the funds would be used to pay off the £509.5m debt to four
banks (www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/jan/22/manchester-united-glazer-bond-
scheme-success). Although the annual interest payment on the bonds is more than
the interest paid in the previous financial year, the debt does not mature until 2017,
which is also when the PIK notes are due for repayment (www.timesonline.co.uk/
tol/sport/football/premier_league/manchester_united/article6997726.ece). The PIK
loan is set to reach £267 million by the end of June 2011 and £310 million in 2012
(www.eufootball.biz/finance/8560-manchester_united_owners_hit_loan_interest_
hike.html). The bonds were issued by Manchester United Finance Plc but Glazer does
not guarantee the debt of MU Finance Plc. It relies on other companies within the MU
group to do that.
Hidden in The small print of the 322 page bond prospectus was a provision for the
Glazers to take £127m[20] cash out of the club in 2011 (Conn and Gibson, 2010a). While
the accounts do not suggest that the Glazers took a salary from MU, management fees,
consultancy agreement and the £10m the six family members borrowed from United
make a total of £22.9m paid to the family and their affiliated companies from the
take-over until 2010. In the same period, ticket prices almost doubled (Conn, 2010).
Overall, the takeover is estimated to have cost MU £340m in cash. That comprises
£220m in bank interest plus “early-repayment premiums” made when the borrowings
were first refinanced in August 2006. A further £120m will have been incurred in fees
paid to bankers, lawyers and other professionals[21] (Conn and Gibson, 2010b).
The Glazer case
Despite all the financial wheeling and dealing, the Glazers continued justification for
ownership of MU is that they are successful entrepreneurs who are billionaires and
hold more than £2 billion of assets. Yet press reports suggest that many of the 64
shopping malls owned by the Glazers are suffering from negative equity where the
debts due on a property outweigh the resale value of that property. Of the 64 shopping
malls owned by First Allied Corporation, 63 have mortgages. Twenty five of the
shopping malls were remortgaged in the six months prior to the Glazers’ takeover of
MU which is why some argue the “cash” put up by the Glazers for the purchase of the
club is simply debt from somewhere else. “Mortgage documents seen by the BBC show
that the Glazers have borrowed £388m ($570m) against shopping malls and £66m
($95m) against their American National Football League team, the Tampa Bay
Buccaneers” (www.bbc.co.uk/news/10237268).
The Tampa Bay Buccaneers have mortgages approaching US $100 million. Added
to that, banks in the USA have put 28 of the shopping malls owned by First Allied
Corporation on a watch list, which means they are concerned about the loans. Four
malls, in Ohio, New Mexico, Texas and Georgia have already gone bankrupt
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/10237268). When the debt owed by the Glazer family in the USA
is added to the debt owed in the UK the total debt comes to £1.1 billion
(www.bbc.co.uk/news/10237268). Because of the debt, MU does not pay corporation
tax. Arguably this has meant a loss of income in the form of UK taxes so far of £80
million. The fans of MU are understandably concerned about the debt levels at the
club. So too is UEFA[22], as was the UK government which held a House of Commons’
Culture, Media and Sport committee inquiry, in May 2011, into football governance in
which David Gill defended the level of debt at MU. In some ways, what he said to the
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committee is an example of how performance metrics (in this case financial measures)
can act as a veil. He said that an annual interest of £45 million did not impede on the
operations of the club and that since the Glazers takeover in 2006, commercial revenues
had increased from £40 million to over £100 million. Gill suggested that these
commercial revenue increases were down to Glazer when the increase could have been
achieved without the Glazer take-over[23]. Interestingly he said that match day
turnover was down by 0.4 per cent to £52.4 million (www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-
12676378). It is not possible to find out if this is because of falling ticket sales or people
are spending less on consumables on matchdays.
In this section we set have out the key events surrounding the Glazer takeover of a
financially sound, profitable football club, burdened it with significant debts which
accrued rates of interest which could have been used to improve the players or the
facilities.
Making sense of accountability in football
In this section we will discuss three different elements of accountability in so far as
they impact on the field of football. First, we will consider the role of
corporate/managerial vulgate accountability especially in relation to the Glazer
take-over of MU mainly from the perspective of the fans. We will then discuss the role
of Malcolm Glazer and consider his accountability from a psychoanalytic perspective.
Finally we will consider the key performance measurement systems in the field of
football, the results and league table positions and how they impact on the key players
in the field.
Vulgate accountability in football
The MU take-over demonstrates the problems with vulgate accountability from a
broader perspective. It seems clear that from a broadly legalistic
corporate-accountability perspective, MU as a plc have fulfilled their accountability
obligations. Moreover, they have satisfied the criteria set out in The All Party Football
Group Inquiry Panel (2009) on transparency and accountability to fans. Yet, seemingly
against the wishes of the MU Board, and the extremely passionate, intelligent and well
organised fans, the Glazer takeover went ahead. The forms of corporate accountability
gave no power to the fans to prevent the take over of their club. At least in the field of
football, this suggests that while accountability may have come to mean control
through the provision of information and the ability to sanction, in terms of corporate
vulgate accountability to the fans (the stakeholders), it is meaningless.
The MU board were arguably rendered impotent before the take-over was anywhere
near completion, when Glazer used his share holding of over 25 per cent to vote off
three directors from the board. While it is not possible to know how this would have
impacted on the remaining directors, theory would suggest that the fear of
exclusion[24] leads to a form of self-absorption; it forces one back to a concern with
one’s own singular survival (see for example, Roberts, 1991). Thus, the corporate form
of MU enabled Glazer to discipline the board in a manner in which the individuals on
the board would find it difficult to challenge him, even though he did not at that stage
own a majority of the shares. Press reports suggested that the two other key
shareholders in the take-over, JP McManus and John Magnier, did not exercise their
power to vote on this issue and that McManus and Magnier could have been
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negotiating with Glazer to obtain the highest possible price for their shares. It was
estimated that they earned between £80m and £90m for the sale of their shares (Bower,
2005). This raises the question as to whether or not McManus and Magnier could in
any sense be described as being accountable to the fans. The press reports suggest not.
Arguably, Glazer’s takeover has been to the detriment of the field more generally
and thus should have been of concern to the Football Association (FA). Bower (2005)
argues that the FA should, as regulators, have examined the Glazers’ background and
their intentions and the fact that the club is a public company should not prevent the
regulator demanding satisfaction of certain standards to ensure the wellbeing of the
whole game. Thus, he stated that:
The real villains of football’s rot are the short-sighted and intellectually limited executives at
the Football Association. Notorious for their blazers, passion for freebies and parochial
outlook, the executives and members of the FA are amateurs, stubbornly loath to reform
themselves. Unwilling to prevent corruption among agents, remove conflicts of interest
among club owners and cure indiscipline among players, they have exposed themselves as
worse than impotent (Bower, 2005, p 20).
Michie (2005)[25] argues that government competition law is part of the problem. He
argues that UK competition law in inadequate since it is based on the premise that only
badly run companies will be under the threat of take-over, whereas in practice
corporate raiders frequently target successful companies. Some of these raiders
transform low risk companies into high risk ones through LBOs. The Competition
Commission, for whom the issue of public interest has been further downgraded, has
said nothing. To Michie, the Glazer take-over flies in the face of recent progress, from
the government’s 1997 Football Task Force to the launch of the Independent Football
Commission (to deal with complaints from fans) and Supporters Direct (to promote
supporters’ trusts). The government have paid lip-service to greater fan involvement
but have not changed the legal structures to prevent another Glazer take-over
happening at different club.
Malcolm Glazer’s accountability
Thus far we have argued that MU as a plc’s accountability to fans in the sense of
giving the fans any kind of genuine say in the ownership, and so the financial
structure, of their club was a charade. Moreover, none of the other key players could be
described as being accountable to the fans in the sense of the fans being able to
sanction them or to control their activities. But what was the effect on Malcolm Glazer
in terms of his self-reflection when he was constantly bombarded by criticism from the
fans? The Lacanian insight here is that people who make it to the top may suffer from
the “essentially mad conviction of being an autonomous sovereign individual.” Roberts
(2001) argues that accountability is vital for the powerful personality as a process that
keeps individuals sane by reminding them of their dependence on others and their own
human limitations. As an individual subject, unless Glazer did not suffer from the
conviction of being an autonomous sovereign individual, was he not devastated by the
activities of the fans and therefore felt moved to appease them? This question really
depends on Glazer’s relationship to the field of football. Had he adopted what Bourdieu
would describe as the illusio of the field? Or in Lacan’s terms, had he identified with
those in the field who suffered from illusio? An individual’s desire is shaped and
structured by those with whom they identify and identification is the process whereby
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the subject assumes the underlying structure of the other. For Glazer to suffer in a
psychoanalytic sense he would have had to identify with the fans in a Lacanian sense.
He attends matches and is entitled to “sit like an emperor in the centre of Old Trafford’s
directors’ box while millions of fans across the world cheer his team” (Bower, 2005,
p. 20). He will be recognised throughout the world as the owner of the world’s most
famous club. He put his children on the MU board. And, “more than other club owners,
he will be relentlessly pursued for pronouncements on all issues, enhancing his status
as a sage” (Bower, 2005, p. 20). One might imagine that these activities would serve as
significant reflectors, but, the theoretical perspective outlined in this paper would
suggest otherwise.
While Glazer may not have liked the reaction of the fans; he ruthlessly pursued his
ownership of the club. At the time of writing, this could perhaps be seen as a wise
business decision which would attract recognition from others in the economic field. It
has recently been reported that Glazer could float Manchester United on the Hong Kong
stock exchange in a £1.7bn exit of the business which cost £790m in 2005 (Russell, 2011).
Moreover, as Bourdieu explains, our mental structures are reinforced by the objective
structures in society. The objective structures are dominated by the field of economics
such that the impact of bank managers and other large creditors are liable to dominate
the mind of Glazer. He will be accountable to his bankers first and foremost.
Accountability, transparency and KPIs
Finally we turn to the overall impact of accountability and transparency on the
decision makers in football clubs. The key performance measures for any club from a
fans perspective are its results and its league table position. In some ways akin to stock
prices, football fans judge their teams’ results against their competitors. Of course there
is a complex network of activities that underpin these simple performance measures.
Moreover, the results do not always accurately reflect the labours of the previous
week’s training, the skill levels of the players and so on. The majority of participants
on the field recognise this and thus avariciously hunt for and demand more finely
grained information. It is for this reason that media outlets and the internet are full of
and continually search for stories about the leading clubs. This information is not, we
argue, accountability.
However, the demand for accountability and the tyranny of the transparency of the
league tables do impact on the senior executives of clubs (most notable the chairmen
(sic) and on managers. For the chairmen of clubs and for club managers these simple
performance measures serve as an easily definable target (ideal) on which they are
judged (reflected). Managers in particular do suffer from illusio but so too do many
chairmen. Football results have the potential to (and do) penetrate into the mentalities
of chairmen and managers and can create what Power (1997) calls altered “perceptions
of significance.” Transparency begins to transform the subjectivity of those it renders
visible (Roberts, 2009). I am my results and I find my own value reflected in them. In
the glare of league tables and weekly results, managers and chairmen can become
individualised. If the results are good, then all will be fine. But bad results could
involve the turning of aggressive criticism back onto the self for failure to meet the
ideal. This is frequently reinforced by the desire on the part of the fans for their teams
to win. At the same time, the severity of self criticism can also create the need to find
others on who to project all that is bad or inadequate in order to protect and preserve a
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sense of perfection (see Hood, 2007). This may explain why good managers are
dismissed following a series of unsatisfactory results. Club chairmen/owners have the
power to dismiss managers and will do so to reflect criticism away from themselves.
Alex Ferguson is English football’s longest serving manager and in all English football
leagues there have been 969 sackings since he took charge of Manchester United in
November 1986. In 2010, the League Managers Association revealed that football
managers’ jobs on average last 1.4 years before they are sacked (Bird, 2010).
The glare of transparency may also go some way to explaining the financial problems
of the field and its extreme wage levels at the top of the field. While it is certainly the case
that the field is structured to tend towards oligopoly, the financial travails of clubs could
be worsened by the pressure placed on chairmen by increasingly desperate managers
who argue that this or that (too expensive) player is bound to make a difference. There is
intense pressure from managers to buy an unaffordable “star” that will save the team
from relegation, propel it up the league table and make the fans “reflect them”. Moreover,
since teams are also judged by the results of their competitors there may be a temptation
to jump in and buy players which have been targeted by other clubs.
In this section we have considered accountability in football from three perspectives.
First we considered how the dominants in the field of football, while complying with
their legal accountability did not manage to resist the Glazer take-over. Any popular
conception of accountability as meaning “holding others to account” or “making them
responsible” was rendered meaningless in the face of a more powerful individual
stepping onto the field and doing whatever he wanted to. In short, when an actor with the
most power does exactly as he wants, calls to hold him to account, or to make him more
accountable are the twenty-first century equivalent of rain-dances. We then discussed
accountability from a more psychoanalytic perspective. We considered Glazer’s
accountability in terms of his desire for positive reflection. We argued that as a
businessman he would have taken on the structures and values of the business
community; thus the very different values of those on the field of football, even the angry
fans, would have had little impact on him from a psychoanalytic perspective. Finally,
through the theoretical insights developed early in this paper, we offered an explanation
for the very high wage levels and financial problems which dominate the field.
Conclusion and future prospects
The word “accountability” has taken root and prospered in a very specific economic,
social and political context. The context is one in which there is extreme wealth
inequality; drastic cuts in state social welfare expenditure which will mean a denial of
the educational and other opportunities which have been a means of social
advancement exacerbating the gulf in wealth; and an economic crisis that will perhaps
destroy the life enhancing potentialities of a generation of young people. In addition to
this many services previously provided by democratically elected states are being sold
by profit making non-elected bodies. In this setting we increasingly hear the word
accountability. For the general populous, abused by extremes of power inequality, the
generally accepted reaction is that those in power should be held to account.
Politicians, bankers, and corporate executives (like Murdoch) should all be more
accountable. This paper had tried to drive a very modest wedge into this vulgate term.
As we set out in the MU case – what is the purpose of being given many broad-ranging
accounts if you have no power to change things?
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This is not at all to suggest that as individuals we should be unconcerned about the
impact of our actions on others. For the most part we are concerned. But what we have
tried to argue is that individuals are constructed and reconstructed throughout their
lives in their positions in the various fields in which they operate. These fields have
different structures and values which individuals both embody and desire. The most
powerful on the economic field will not be too concerned about their impact on those
with whom they cannot identify. A small child with be upset by the angry look of their
mother with whom they closely identify; but Malcolm Glazer will not be deeply
perturbed by the angry looks of 100,000 Manchester United fans because he does not
identify with them. From a Lacanian or Bourdieusian perspective, it is simply not
possible for Glazer to be accountable to the fans unless he shares their symbolic
structures and this is not simply a question of being a participant on the same field but
of being in the same hierarchical position on the field.
Participants who have an emotional and psychological stake in a field, who do
identify with and embody its rules and structures, will be affected both by performance
measures which are deemed to reflect their performance (themselves) and by the fans
who share a common illusio. The subject’s entry into the symbolic order explains their
desire to have their cultural capital recognised. In the field of football, a manager’s
cultural capital is valued by the field thus reinforcing their affinity with the symbolic
order of the field. Their results (performance measures), will be both a source of anxiety
and desire, and, given their belief that there are always “better (more expensive)
players” who will enable them to participate and enhance their position on the field,
managers will want to spend to their financial limit and beyond. Football club
chairmen, due to their position on the field, will also be aware of financial performance
measures but they too will fear relegation and want to improve their own and their
team’s position in the field.
Taken as a whole the term accountability serves to maintain and enhance the
positions of the most powerful in three ways:
(1) Accountability serves as an opiate of the people. Calls are made to hold the most
powerful to account, especially when the abuses of their power become clear.
The state has responded by implementing performance measurement systems
(especially in state or formerly state owned institutions) and by giving the term
accountability a juridical guise. The outcome is that the less powerful might feel
that “their voices are heard.” But, not only do performance measure warp
organisational activities, they also, impose an unhealthy amount of stress on the
workforce subjected to these measures.
(2) Accountability serves to immunize the most powerful from criticism.
Government ministers can pretend that they are in control by introducing
performance measures, which can be changed and adapted at will thus
immunizing them from criticism. And as we saw from the MU case, there were
neo-judicial claims to being accountable since MU as a company had to comply
with various codes and reporting requirements, whereas in effect, there was
scant, if any, accountability on the part of the key players.
(3) Accountability in the form of performance metrics serves to “individualise”
employees. This individualisation can serve to weaken the bargaining position
of employees by rendering them anxious and fearful.
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Thus far we have been highly critical of vulgate accountability. So are there any “ways
forward” for the fans? The Independent Manchester United Supporters Trust
recognises that the structures of the field limit the power of the fans, in their web site;
they state that they are striving “for a future in which the loyal supporters of
Manchester United FC possess significant ownership in the club. Only by securing a
meaningful ownership stake can we ensure – permanently and irrevocably – that the
priorities are set straight. We aim for the day when the distinction between supporters
and owners no longer exists.” (www.joinmust.org/about/ouraims.php). It is beyond the
scope of the paper to discuss the likelihood of such changes given the significant vested
interests on the field of football but perhaps such significant change would require
something really radical on the part of the fans. It could require them to absent
themselves from the field until their voices are heard. Jonathan Michie (2005, p. 26)
makes a compelling case for this:
If the only way of saving the club is to bankrupt the company, that would be a price well
worth paying. I started supporting United when I met my wife-to-be 18 years ago; she had
been a season ticket holder in the 1970s when the club were playing in the second division.
They were great days, she says – certainly better than the prospect of supporting Glazer
& Sons. So boycott the club’s sponsors so they abandon the deals. Don’t buy the merchandise.
Hit the company’s profits so the debt repayments can’t be made. Then we supporters can pick
up the pieces, take a controlling stake in the club and put the plc era behind us. Perhaps that
will only come about through a financial meltdown. And that could result in another spell of
second division football. Bring it on.
The paradox here is that perhaps if the MU fans en masse boycotted every game and
piece of MU merchandise they could have prevented the MU take-over by Glazer; but,
being a fan is about being a participant. In Bourdieusian terms, this is a fan’s habitus.
This deep psychological and physical attachment which fans feel for their teams
means that they support their teams through thick and thin and are proud to do so. The
fan’s habitus would dictate that eventually Malcolm Glazer will be gone but
Manchester United will still be there.
But does this mean that, as the Eagleton quote at the beginning of this paper
suggests, nobody “serious about political change can shirk the fact that the game has
to be abolished”? We do not know whether this is that case or not. However, profound
progressive social change is not normally achieved without a philosophical
understanding of the way society works (alongside leadership, organisation and
struggle.) With this in mind, in this paper we have set out with the modest aim of
critically reflecting on the contemporary use of the sign accountability and its role in
“remaking our world” in favour of the most powerful. Progressive social change and
“holding people to account” is not the same thing.
Notes
1. In the USA, football is called soccer.
2. Therefore this is meant with no disrespect to other nationalities.
3. The Vulgate is a Latin edition or translation of the Bible by Saint Jerome at the end of the
fourth century. The signifier vulgate has come to mean the common speech of a people; the
vernacular or a widely accepted text or version of a work.
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4. While there is no 100 per cent correlation between money invested and success on the field,
there is a correlation between investment and success (Hall et al., 2002).
5. While it is socially constructed, in a certain political, social and economic era,
“accountability” has become “reified” – we treat it as something objective (Sinclair, 1995).
6. An ex-player with recognised high cultural capital – a genuine feel for the game.
7. There is a sense of lack at the core of our being so “desire to possess the lost Phallus is the
motor behind much human activity, which keeps at bay the anxiety which arises out of the
acceptance of one’s lack of it” (Bailly, 2009 p. 124).
8. In the English Premier League during the course of a season (from August to May), each club
plays the others twice, once at their home stadium and once at that of their opponents.
Teams receive three points for a win and one point for a draw. No points are awarded for a
loss. At the end of each season, the club with the most points is crowned champion. The three
lowest placed teams are relegated into the next lower league, the Football League
Championship and the top two teams from the Championship, together with the winner of
play-offs involving the third to sixth placed Championship clubs, are promoted in their place.
9. The ruling was made in a consolidation of three separate legal cases, Belgian Football
Association v Jean-Marc Bosman; R.F.C. de Lie`ge v Jean-Marc Bosman and others; and
UEFA v Jean-Marc Bosman.
10. In 2009/2010, each of the 32 clubs which play in the UEFA Champions League will earn e7.1
million, for participating in the first 6 games of the competition. A club will also receive
e400,000 for a draw (tie) and e800,000 for a win. After the first six matches, 16 clubs will be
eliminated. The teams who progress will receive e3 million for participating, e3.3 million for
reaching the quarter finals, e4 million for getting to the semi-finals, e5.2 for reaching the final
and e9 million for winning. If, a club won every game all the way to the final they would
receive e36.4 million in Champions League prize money alone. http://www.suite101.com/
content/uefa-champions-league-prize-money-2010-and-tv-rights-revenue-a236167#ixzz1Sf8
MUCFH (accessed 20 July, 2011).
11. Their “investment” involves economic capital; it also involves other investments for example
time. Their “profits” are symbolic akin to medieval art patrons who can demonstrate their
“honour” and status by the ownership of important “cultural assets”.
12. The research carried out for this report involved 18 countries in Europe, reinforced by field
work in six of the countries (Britain, France, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands and Spain)
which involved observation, recordings of heart rates at matches, interviews and in-depth
discussions with fans, alongside telephone and internet interviews with fan. A pan-European
poll of 2,000 fans was also conducted.
13. Sir Norman Chester Centre for Football Research, University of Leicester.
14. Prepared by The Football Association Limited with the assistance of Grant Thornton UK.
15. It is paradoxical that the FA suggests that football clubs should be accountable but it does
not suggest that the FA itself should be.
16. Forbes.com estimated that MU was worth $1.84 billion in April 2010. MU’s Club TV Channel
is shown in over 192 million homes.
17. The billionaire owner of Chelsea football club.
18. A group of fan’s reaction to the take-over was to form a breakaway club, FC United. The FC
United web site states that FC United would have been set up without Glazer’s take-over.
The take-over was the catalyst, the final straw, but not the sole reason. www.fc-utd.co.uk/
history.php
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19. “Junk” bonds mean the bonds are rated BB or lower. They are highly speculative and usually
offer interest rates 3 or 4 per cent above safe government bonds. This high rate of return is to
compensate for their perceived high risk of default.
20. £70m out of MU’s cash reserves þ£25m as a dividend þ£23m (half of the MU profits) þ£6
(for administration and management services) þ£3m (in respect of services provided by
directors, officers or employees of companies the Glazer’s use to hold their MU shares).
21. The fees for the bond issue are noted as £15m and £35m incurred by the club’s interest rate
hedging arrangements. On top of that, the “payments” have incurred interest payable of
around £124m since the Glazers first borrowed the money to buy United.
22. In a bid to curb “the financial excesses that have brought a considerable number of clubs into
difficulty in recent times [...] and safeguard the long-term health of European Football”.
(www.uefa.com/uefa/footballfirst/protectingthegame/financialfairplay/news/
newsid ¼ 1520059.html) UEFA plan to introduce Financial Fair Play rules in 2012/13. This
will require clubs to comply with a break even principle where a club must not repeatedly
spend more than it generates over a period of three years. It means that at current levels
three quarters of the English Premier league clubs will have to significantly reduce spending
on players wages to comply with the rules (http://www.guardian.co.uk/football/2010/may/
26/premier-league-uefa-financial-fair-play).
23. Equally, unlike others, he was unconcerned that the ultimate parent company of the club,
Red Football LLC had transferred from Nevada to Delaware where companies’ beneficial
ownership information is not registered.
24. Foucault talks of discipline’s effects in terms of the way it “compares, differentiates,
hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes.”
25. Prof Michie was one of the first chairpersons of Shareholders United, formerly Shareholders
United Against Murdoch, a not-for-profit organisation dedicated to promote fan ownership
in Manchester United F.C. They successfully thwarted Rupert Murdoch’s attempt to take
over Manchester United. When his term as chair passed in 2004, Shareholders United had
over 30,000 members and owned 1 per cent of Manchester United. The organisation is now
known as the Manchester United Supporters’ Trust.
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